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THE AFTERMATH OF SWEET HOME CHAPTER:
MODIFICATION OF WILDLIFE HABITAT AS A PROHIBITED
TAKING IN VIOLATION OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
STEVEN G. DAVISON"

I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon 1, substantial
uncertainty still exists as to when timber harvesting, clearing of other
vegetation, leveling of land, or other modification or alteration of wildlife
habitat (either on publicly or privately-owned land), will violate the "takings"
prohibitions2 of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). 3 In its Sweet Home
Chapter decision, the Supreme Court held that a regulation4 promulgated by
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS"), providing that "harm"
and a "taking" in violation of the ESA may occur when modification of
habitat of an animal kills or "injures" the animal, is not facially invalid.
The Sweet Home Chapter decision, however, did not determine how
this FWS regulation should be interpreted and applied in the myriad
situations where the habitat of protected wildlife is modified. Consequently,
courts and commentators continue to disagree on the issues of what kinds and
types of adverse impacts on a member of a protected species caused by
habitat modification can be considered to "harm" ("actually" kill or injure)
and "take" an animal. Disagreement also exists on what kinds of evidence are
required to prove that habitat modification has "harmed" a protected animal
in violation of the ESA's takings prohibitions.
This Article analyzes the ESA' s prohibitions on the taking of animals
that are members of a protected species of fish or wildlife and the Supreme
• ProfessorofLaw, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S., Cornell University (1968);
Yale Law School (1971). The author served as co-counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants in
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 148 P.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1081 (1999). The viewpoints expressed in this Article are those of the
author and not those of either the Plaintiffs-Appellants or co-counsel in that litigation.
I 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
2
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B)-(C) (2000); 50 C.P.R.§§ 17.3, 17.31 (2002).
3
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
4
50 C.P.R.§ 17.3 (2002).
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Court's Sweet Home Chapter ·decision. The Article will then analyze
contemporary judicial and scholarly positions on the types of adverse impacts
on protected animals caused by habitat modification that will constitute an
"injury" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA. The Article also
examines the kinds of circumstantial and direct evidence that will be
considered sufficient to prove that a taking in violation of the ESA has been
proximately caused by modification of habitat of a protected animal.
This Article concludes that a protected animal should be considered
to be "injured" and "taken" in violation of the ESA not only when
modification of the habitat causes a serious and permanent physical injury,
wound, or disease to a protected animal, but also when habitat modification
otherwise significantly adversely affects a protected animal, even
temporarily, by significantly impairing the animal's feeding, sheltering,
breeding, or reproduction. Proof of harming a protected ariimal by modifying
its habitat, in violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions, should be available
through circumstantial evidence (including data garnered by monitoring of
telemetry transmissions from a protected animal or proof of a reduction of
the population of members of a protected species within a particular habitat
after that habitat has been modified) as well as by different kinds of direct
evidence (including field observations of a protected animal or videotape of
the actions and behavior of a protected animal).

ll.

PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE HABITAT UNDER THE ESA

The ESA not only seeks to prevent the extinction of listed endangered5 and threatened species6 of fish, birds, other wildlife, and plants/ but
also seeks recovery of listed species by increasing the population of listed
species so that the species no longer need to be listed under and protected by
the ESA. 8 In addition to seeking to protect members of listed species from
5

See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2000) (defining an "endangered species" as "any species [other
than certain excluded insect pests] which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range").
6
See id. § 1532(20) (defining "threatened species" as "any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion
of its range").
7
See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 690
(1995).
8
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b), 1532(3) (2000). See also Sierra Club v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2001).
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death or harm caused by direct application of.force through the prohibition
and punishment of the import, export, killing, possession, and sale of
protected listed anirrials,9 the ESA also attempts to safeguard listed animals
from .indirect harm by protecting the habitat of endangered and threatened
species of fish and wildlife from destruction or adverse alteration or
modification. 10 ·
The protection of habitat oflisted species of animals is accomplished
not only by governmental acquisition and preservation of habitat, 11 but also
by restrictions on both private and governmental actions that adversely
modify or alter the habitat of protected species of fish and wildlife. 12 Under
section 5 13 ·Of the ESA, the federal government is authorized to acquire land
in order to protect wildlife habitat as part of conservation programs for
endangered and threatened species, "before the seller's activity has harmed
any endangered animal." 14 Land also may be acquired under section 5 of the
ESA to prevent "modification of land that is not yet but may in the future
become habitat for an endangered or threatened species." 15
In addition to restrictions on the modification of wildlife habitat
under the ESA's takings prohibitions, section 7(a)(2) 16 of the ESA prohibits
actions carried out or assisted by the federal government that threaten either
to extinguish a protected species or to modify adversely the designated
habitat of a protected species.
A.

Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA

Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA imposes a broad, affirmative duty 17 upon
each federal administrative agency and departmentto "insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species [of fish, wildlife, or plants] or result in the destruction or adverse
9

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A)-(F) (2000).
/d.§ 1531(b); Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at698; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 179 (1978).
II 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (2000).
12
/d.§§ 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B)-(C); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.3, 17.31 (2002).
13
16 u.s.c. § 1534 (2000).
14
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 702-03.
15
/d. at 703.
16
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(2000).
17
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703.
10
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modification of habitat of such species .... " 18 which has been determined to
be "critical," under ESA sections 4(a)(3) 19 and 4(b)(2),20 by the Secretary of
Commerce or Interior. 21 Unlike the FWS regulation defining harm under the
ESA's takings prohibitions, section 7(a)(2)'s provisions are not limited to a
habitat modification that actually kills or injures members of a protected
species. 22
However, in order for section 7(a)(2) to apply to an action of a private
individual, business, or state or local government, the action must be
licensed, permitted, or funded by the federal government. 23 Furthermore,
section 7(a)(2) applies only to "actions in which there is discretionary
Federal involvement or control,"24 and therefore does not apply to an action
that an agency is required to perform "if certain statutory criteria are met." 25
In addition, section 7(a)(2) does not apply to an action that is solely the
action of a private person, business, or state or local government, with no
involvement of any kind by the federal government. 26
The ESA's takings prohibitions/7 however, apply to "any person," 28
without regard to whether the person's action either is discretionary or is
permitted, licensed, or funded by the federal government, with the ESA
defining person to include "an individual, corporation, partnership, ... or any
other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, or
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State,
municipality, or political subdivision of a State. " 29
18

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).

19

/d. § 1533(a)(3).
20
/d. § 1533(b)(2).

Cf Federico Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat, in ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 47 (Donald C. Baur & William Robert Irvin eds.,
ABA Section of Environment, Energy and Resources 2002) [hereinafter ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT] (explaining that as of Apri130, 2000, critical habitat had been designated under
the ESA for only 124 of the 1231 domestic species of plants, fish, and wildlife that were
listed under the ESA as endangered or threatened).
22
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703.
23
Proffitt v. Dep't of Interior ex rei. Lujan, 825 F. Supp. 159, 164 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
24
50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2002).
25
Strahan v. Linnon, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, at *10 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998).
26
See Deborah L. Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA § 7 Consultations Over Existing Projects,
8 NAT. RESOURCES &ENV'T, Summer 1993, at 17, 17-18.
27
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B)-(C) (2000).
28
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995).
29
16
§ 1532(13) (2002).

21

u.s.c.
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To violate the first clause of section 7(a)(2), an action must threaten
to make a particular protected species extinct-in other words, the action
must threaten to kill all existing members ofthe species (thus threatening the
species' survival). 30 This first clause of section 7(a)(2) can be violated by a
construction project, such as the building of a dam on a river, that threatens
to extinguish the only known members of a protected species by destroying
the species' habitat. 31 On the other hand, the ESA's takings prohibitions can
be violated by the killing, injury, or other taking of even one animal that is
a member of a protected species, 32 even if the taking does not threaten to
extinguish the species. 33
In order to violate the second clause of section 7(a)(2) (protecting a
species' designated critical habitat), the habitat has to be destroyed or
adversely modified, and the habitat has to have been designated as "critical"
by the Secretary of Interior or Commerce. 34 The habitat, however, does not
have to be on land owned by the federal government; both clauses of section
7(a)(2) can apply to habitat and land that is owned by a private person,
corporation, or state or local govemment. 35
Under the ESA, an ongoing or proposed action that is, or will be, in
violation of section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions is required to be halted
by a court by issuance of an injunction without the court balancing the
competing equities. 36 Neither a federal agency or department that violates
section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions is subject to civil or criminal
penalties under section 11 37 of the ESA, nor is an employee or agent of a
federal agency or department who is responsible for a violation of section
7(a)(2) subject to any civil or criminal penalties under section 11 of the ESA.
The ESA seeks to insure that federal agencies and departments
comply with section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions by requiring federal
agencies and departments to follow specified procedures prior to taking any
action that might violate section 7(a)(2). In the case of certain major actions,
30

See generally Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F. 3d 434 (5th Cir.
2001).
31
See generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
32
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D.
Fla. 1995).
33 /d.
34
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,703 (1995).
35
Lawrence R. Liebesman and Steven G. Davison, Takings of Wildlife Under the
Endangered Species Act After Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 5 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 151 (1995).
36
See Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 153.
37
16 u.s.c. § 1540 (2000).

546

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 27:541

a federal agency or department first is required to find but, from either FWS
or the National Marine Fisheries Service C'NMFS"),: if any species of plants,
fish, or wildlife may be present in the area where the proposed action will
take place. 38 If any members of a listed species or a species proposed to be
listed under the ESA may be present in the area, the federal agency or
department is required to prepare a biological assessment that determines
whether the proposed action will have any adverse effects on any members
of listed or proposed-for-listing species. 39 If an agency or department
determines, from a biological assessment or from informal consultation40
with FWS or NMFS, that a listed endangered or threatened species is likely
to be adversely affected by the proposed action, the agency or department
must consult, formally or informally, with FWS or NMFS, and obtain a
biological opinion from FWS or NMFS. 41 The biological opinion is required
to determine whether the proposed action will violate section 7(a)(2)'s
substantive prohibitions and whether mitigation measures are required to
minimize adverse impacts on protected species. 42 If the biological opinion
concludes that the proposed action would violate section 7(a)(2)'s
substantive prohibitions, the action cannot go forward, and the agency or
department must follow an alternative suggested by FWS or NMFS that FWS
or NMFS believes would not violate section 7(a)(2) of the ESA. 43
B.

ESA 's Takings Prohibitions

Section 9(a)(l)(B) 44 of the ESA makes it unlawful for any person45
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take a listed endangered
species of fish or wildlife within the United States or the territorial seas of
the United States, and section 9(a)(l)(C)46 of the ESA makes it unlawful for
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take any
38

Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 543 (D. V.I.
1998).
39 /d.
40
See id. at 545 (finding that an agency is not required to prepare a biological assessment if
it engages in informal consultation with FWS or NMFS to determine if the agency's
proposed action will violate section 7(a)(2)'s substantive prohibitions).
41
/d. at 539.
42
/d. at 543.
43 /d.
44
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B) (2000).
45
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
46
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(C) (2000).

1
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endangered species of fish or wildlife upon the high seas, except as otherwise
provided in two sections47 of the ESA. 48 In addition, section 9(g)49 of the ESA
makes it "unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States to attempt to commit, solicit another to commit, or cause to be
committed, any offense defined in ... section [9 of the ESA]"-which
includes the two previously-mentioned takings prohibitions.
The ESA defines "take" to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct."50 Acting .under authority granted to it by the ESA to adopt
"appropriate" regulations to enforce the ESA,51 the FWS, which has authority
under the ESA to protect terrestrial endangered and threatened species of fish
and wildlife,52 has adopted regulations53 defining both "harass" and "harm"
for purposes of the ESA's taking prohibitions. FWS has defined "harm" in
the ESA' s definition of "take" to mean "an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife [that is a listed endangered or
threatened species under the ESA] by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."54 Under this
FWS definition of "harm," modification of the habitat of a protected species
offish or wildlife can be a prohibited "take" in violation of the ESA.55 FWS,
47

/d. §§ 1535(g), 1539.
See generally Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking
Under the Endangered Species Act~ 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155, 164-70 (1995)

48

(discussing the statutory and regulatory exemptions from the ESA's general prohibitions on
takings oflisted endangered and threatened species offish and wildlife). See also infra notes
78-91 and accompanying text (Exemptions from the ESA's takings prohibitions can be
granted in Incidental Take Permits issued under 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) and Incidental
Take Statements issued under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4).).
49
16 u.s.c. § 1538(g) (2000).
so /d. § 1532(19).
SJ Jd. § 1540(t).
52
/d.§ 1532(15); 50 C.P.R.§§ 17 .2(b), 17.11 (2002). The National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") has jurisdiction under the ESA over endangered and threatened species of marine
fish and wildlife./d. § 222.101.
53
50 C.P.R.§ 17.3 (2002).
54
/d. See also id. § 222.102 ("Harm" is defined similarly for purposes of regulation of
prohibited takings of endangered and threatened species of marine fish and wildlife under
the NMFS' s jurisdiction under the ESA. This Article analyzes only the FWS 's definition of
"harm" under the ESA and the application of this definition to modification of the habitat of
terrestrial fish and wildlife protected under the ESA.).
ss See infra notes 137-222 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of the FWS
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however, has stated that its definition of "harass"56 should not be applied to
modification or destruction of wildlife habitat since its definition of "harm"
deals with habitat modification and destruction. 57
As a result of the ESA's broad definition of "person," 58 these ESA
prohibitions on taking or causing a taking apply to "an individual, corporation
... ; any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the
Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of
a State ... ; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; [and]
... any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."59
Because of this definition of "person" under the ESA, the ESA's takings
prohibitions do not require, as does section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, a permit,
license, or funds from the federal government in order to apply to a private
individual, a corporation, or a state or local government.
Furthermore, while the second clause of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA
only applies to wildlife habitat that has been designated as "critical" under
the ESA, the ESA' s takings prohibitions are applicable to wildlife habitat that
has not been designated as "critical" under the ESA. 60 In addition, the
application of the ESA's takings prohibitions is not dependent upon who
owns the land where a taking occurs-the ESA's takings prohibitions are
applicable on land owned by a private individual, 61 a corporation, and a state
or local government, as well as on land owned by the federal government,
because the ESA's takings prohibitions only require that a prohibited "take"
occur "within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States"62
or "upon the high seas." 63
The FWS's definition of "harm" under the ESA's takings prohibitions consequently is the only provision of the ESA that regulates the
regulation defining of "harm" and its application to modification of wildlife habitat).
s6 50 C.P.R.§ 17.3 (2002) (defining "harass" as an intentional or negligent act or omission
which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to,
breeding, feeding, or sheltering).
s1 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412-13 (Sept. 26, 1975).
SS 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (2QQQ).
S9 /d.
60
Loggyrhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D.
Fla. 1995)
61
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. 515 U.S. 687, 707 n.19
(1995).
62
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000).
63
/d. § 1538(a)(l)(C).
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modification of habitat of a protected species of wildlife by a private
individual or corporation or state or local government, when no federal
permit, license, or funds is involved and when the action does not occur on
land owned or administered by the federal government (so that section
7 (a)(2) of the ESA is inapplicable).
Although these prohibitions on "takes" in section 9 of the ESA apply
only to endangered species of fish and wildlife listed under the ESA, the
FWS has promulgated a regulation 64 that generally makes it illegal for any
person to take a threatened species of fish or wildlife within the United
States, the territorial seas of the United States, or upon the high seas. 65
These ESA takings prohibitions do not make it illegal for a person to
take a plant that is a member of a species listed as endangered or threatened
under the ESA. However, in section 9(a)(2)(B)66 the ESA makes it unlawful,
except as provided in sections 6(g)(2)67 and 1068 of the ESA, "for any person
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... to remove and reduce to
possession" any ... [endangered] species [of plants listed under the ESA]
from areas under Federal jurisdiction, maliciously damage or destroy any
such species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy
any such species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or
regulation of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal
trespass law. 69
A person who violates the ESA's prohibitions against taking a listed
endangered or threatened species of wildlife is subject to civil penalties70 and
criminal penalties (which can include imprisonment). 71 In addition, a court
64

50 C.P.R.§ 17.31(a) (2002).
This regulation was held to be within the FWS's authority under section 4(d) of the ESA,
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d), in Sweet Home ChapterofCommunitiesfora Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17
P.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994}, reh'g denied, 30 P.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). FWS, however, has issued special rules, 50 C.P.R.§§ 17.40.48 (200 1), that permit some otherwise prohibited takings of certain threatened species of fish
and wildlife, and also has adopted another rule, 50 C.P.R. § 17.32, which authorizes the
issuance of permits allowing the taking of threatened species of fish and wildlife in certain
circumstances.
66
16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(2)(B) (2000).
67
/d. § 1535(g)(2).
68
!d. § 1539.
69
See 50 C.P.R.§ 17.61(a)-(c)(l) (2002). See also id. § 17.71(a) (prohibiting, subject to
some exceptions, the removal and reduction to possession of listed threatened plant species
from an area under federal jurisdiction).
70
16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (2000).
71
!d. § 1540(b)(l).
65
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can issue an injunction to halt either an ongoing violation of the ESA's
takings prohibitions or a probable (reasonably certain to occur) future violation of the ESA's takings prohibitions, 72 without the traditional balancing
of the respective equities, 73 in a suit brought in federal district court either by
the United States Attorney GeneraC4 or by a "person" with standing to sue
who files a citizen suit under section ll(g)(l)(Af5 of the ESA.
Although the ESA imposes complex procedural duties upon federal
agencies and departments to ensure compliance with the affirmative obligations of section 7(a)(2) ofthe ESA, 76 neither the ESA nor FWS regulations
under the ESA impose any procedural duties upon persons subject to the
ESA' s taking prohibitions to seek to prevent violations of these prohibitions.
However, a person who is subject to the ESA' s takings prohibitions, and who
seeks to determine whether an ongoing or proposed future action by that
person violates or will violate the ESA's takings prohibitions, can request
that FWS issue a "no-take" opinion letter to the person. "No-take" letters
state to the requesting person that FWS will not take enforcement action
under the ESA' s takings prohibitions and enforcement provisions against that
person's ongoing or proposed action if the person engages in certain
specified land uses and implements specified mitigation measures set forth
in a land management plan submitted by the requestor to FWS. 77
If FWS, in an opinion letter or otherwise, determines that a person's
ongoing or proposed future action violates or will violate the ESA' s takings
prohibitions, the person can seek an incidental take permit ("ITP") from FWS
under section 10(a)(l)(B)78 of the ESA, exempting the incidental take of a
protected species from the ESA's takings prohibitions. An ITP can be issued
for foreseeable, but not purposeful, takings 79 that are caused indirectly80 by
habitat modification and development projects. 81 The FWS may issue an ITP
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1108 (1997).
73
Davison, supra note 48, at 173-74.
74
16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6) (2000).
75
!d. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
76
These procedural duties are discussed supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
77
Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities "Take" Listed
Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the "Harm" Regulation?, in ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT, supra note 21, at 207, 244.
78
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B) (2000).
79
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,700 (1995).
72

80

/d.

81

/d.

at 707.
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to a person authorizing the taking of an endangered or threatened species of
wildlife that is otherwise prohibited under the ESA, if the taking "is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful
activity." 82 An ITP cannot be issued "for direct, deliberate action against a
member of an endangered or threatened species." 83
In order to obtain an ITP for an incidental, non-purposeful taking, a
person must implement a habitat conservation plan ("HCP") approved by the
FWS, minimizing and mitigating the impacts of the permitted incidental
taking84 and the FWS must find that the permitted incidental "taking will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species
in the wild ...." 85
A person is not required to seek an ITP under section 10 of the ESA
for an action that is violating or will violate the ESA's takings prohibitions,
but a person is subject to civil and criminal penalties under the ESA if the
person takes a protected listed animal in violation of the ESA without an ITP
or other permit or authorization for such taking. 86
When a proposed action is subject to section 7(a)(2)'s substantive
requirements and attendant procedural obligations, a person may obtain an
exemption from the ESA's takings prohibitions by obtaining and complying
with an incidental take statement ("ITS") issued by the FWS under section
7(b)(4) 87 of the ESA. An ITS is issued by the FWS after formal consultation
under section 7 (a)(2) between the FWS and the federal agency or department,
and after the FWS concludes that the agency action, or a reasonable and
prudent alternative thereto, will not violate section 7(a)(2) and that the incidental taking of an endangered or threatened species authorized by the ITS
will not violate section 7(a)(2). 88 An ITS is required to specify reasonable
and prudent alternatives that the FWS considers necessary or appropriate to
minimize the impact of the incidental taking. 89
82

16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(l)(B) (2000).
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 701.
84
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii).
8
' /d. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
86
Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2000).
87
16 u.s.c. § 1536(b)(4) (2000).
88
ld. Incidental Take Statements under this authority are discussed in Davison, supra note
48, at 166-67.
89
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C)(ii)(2000);seea/soAriz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. United States
Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1242, 1237 (9th Cir. 2001) (declaring that, "absent rare
circumstances such as those involving migratory species, it is arbitrary and capricious to
issue an Incidental Take Statement when the Fish and Wildlife Service has no rational basis
83
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In cases where there is a risk that a person's land development or land
use may cause a taking ·Of a listed threatened species of fish or wildlife, a
person may seek to have the FWS issue a special rule under section 4( d) 90 of
the ESA that exempts the· land development or land use from the ESA's
takings prohibitions. 91
The United States Supreme Court, in its 1995 Sweet Home Chapter
decision, 92 held that the FWS acted within its authority under the ESA in
including certain modifications of wildlife habitat in its definition of "harm"
under the ESA' s takings prohibitions. Because of this ruling, persons who are
planning to harvest timber or to clear and level land inhabited by wildlife
protected under the ESA, or otherwise to alter the habitat of wildlife protected under the ESA, must determine whether there is a possibility that their
proposed land development or land use activity will violate the ESA's
takings prohibitions. If there is a possibility that a proposed land use development or land use activity may violate the ESA's takings prohibitions, the
person has several options. He or she may proceed as planned, or abandon
or alter the plans in order to avoid violating the ESA takings prohibitions, or
to seek an ITP, ITS, or other exemption from the ESA' s takings prohibitions.
To proceed according to the original plans risks civil and criminal penalties
under the ESA if the proposed land development or use does in fact cause a
violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions. In order to decide which of these
alternatives to choose in a particular situation, the person needs to understand
how the FWS regulation defining "harm" under the ESA's takings
prohibitions has been interpreted by FWS, by the Supreme Court in its Sweet
Home Chapter decision, and by other courts and scholarly commentators.

ill.

VALIDITY OF THE FWS REGULATION DEFINING HARM AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S SWEET HOME CHAPTER DECISION

In 1993 and 1994, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the FWS' s regulation defining

to conclude that a take will occur incident to the otherwise lawful activity"). The standard
used to determine if there is a "take" that requires an Incidental Take Statement under section
7 of the ESA is the same standard used to determine if there is a "take" in violation of section
9 of the ESA. /d. at 1237.
90
16 u.s.c. § 1533(d) (2000).
91
Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 77, at 243.
92
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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harm was not facially void for vagueness,93 but was invalid under the ESA
because it was an unreasonable interpretation of the ESA. 94
In 1995, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed this
latter holding in a 6-3 majority decision95 authored by Justice Stevens. In this
decision, the Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 96 the FWS reasonably
interpreted the ESA when it included significant habitat modification
resulting in the actual killing or injuring protected wildlife97 in its regulation
defining "harm," and therefore held that the regulation was not facially
invalid in violation of the ESA. 98
Because the Supreme Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case only
addressed a facial challenge to the FWS regulation defining "harm,"99 Justice
Stevens' majority opinion for the Court in the case did not decide how the
regulation should be interpreted in all of the various factual circumstances in
which it might be applied. Justice Stevens explained that the validity of the
application of the FWS regulation in a particular case will involve. "difficult
questions of proximity and degree ... [that] must be addressed in the usual
course of the law, through case-by-case resolution and adjudication." 100
In his majority opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case,
Justice Stevens held, however, that the taking prohibition of section

93

Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 3-5 (D.C. Cir.
1993), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh 'g denied, 30
F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
94
/d. at 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd,
515 U.S. 687 (1995). This facial challenge was brought by "small landowners, logging
companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest
and in the Southeast, and organizations that represent their interests." Sweet Home Chapter,
515 U.S. at 692.
95
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 687. Justice O'Connor, who joined Justice Stevens'
majority opinion along with four other Justices, also filed a concurring opinion. /d. at 708-14
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia dissented in an opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. /d. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96
467 u.s. 837 (1984).
97
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703,708.
98
See Liebesman & Davison, supra note 35, for an analysis of Justice Stevens' majority
opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, and Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in
the Sweet Home Chapter case.
99
515 U.S. at 692, 699-700.
100
/d. at 708.
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9(a)(l)(B) 101 of the ESA prohibits indirect 102 and unintended 103 takings of
protected wildlife as well as direct and willful, 104 deliberate, 105 and purposeful106 takings of protected wildlife.
In addition, Justice Stevens held in his majority opinion in the Sweet
Home Chapter case that the FWS regulation defining "harm" is subject to
"ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability ... [and]
'but for' causation .... " 107
Justice Stevens' Sweet Home Chapter opinion also indicates that the
FWS regulation defining "harm" requires actual killing or injury 108 of
"particular" animals, 109 but his opinion does not explain how "injures" and
"particular" should be interpreted under the regulation and does not explain
what type of evidence must be presented to satisfy this requirement that a
"particular" animal must actually be killed or injured. 110
In his majority opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case,
Justice Stevens also held that the taking prohibitions of section 9 of the ESA
can apply to habitat modification by private landowners 111 and are not limited
to modification of habitat that has been designated as "critical" under section
4 112 of the ESA 113 (as is the case under the second clause of section 7(a)(2)
of the ESA).
However, the Court in Sweet Home Chapter held that section 9's
takings prohibitions do not impose (as does section 7 of the ESA) "a broad
affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat modifications .... " 114 and do not
101

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B) (2000).
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 697-98, 700, 702, 704.
103
!d. at 701 ("activities not intended to harm an endangered species, such as habitat
modification, may constitute unlawful takings under the ESA unless the Secretary permits
them").
104
!d. at 697.
105
/d. at 705 ("the term 'take' in§ 9 reached far more than the deliberate actions of hunters
and trappers.").
106
/d. at 704.
107
/d. at700n.13.
108
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703.
102

109
110

/d.

This requirement, that a "particular" animal be taken, is analyzed infra at notes 164-80
and accompanying text.
111
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 706 n.l9 ("Neither statement even suggested that ...
habitat modification by private landowners stood outside the ambit of§ 9.").
112
16 u.s.c. § 1533 (2000).
113
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 703.
114 !d.
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require (as does section 7(a)(2) of the ESA) an action that is "likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species." 115 In her concurring opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case,
Justice O'Connor asserted that the FWS regulation defining "harm" "is
limited to . . . habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to
hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected
animals," 116 and that "the regulation's application is limited by ordinary
principles of proximate causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability."117 Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion that the
FWS regulation requires that "individual animals" be actually killed or
injured, 118 while advocating a broad interpretation of "injures" in the FWS
regulation. The FWS regulation includes physical injury to a particular
animal within the definition of "injures" under the FWS regulation, 119 but
Justice O'Connor would not limit the term "injures" under the FWS
regulation to physical injury to a particular animal. Rather, she believes that
the term "injures" in the FWS regulation also includes significant impairment
of an animal's breeding that prevents the birth of new offspring of that
animal.I2o
Justice O'Connor asserted, however, that the FWS regulation should
not be interpreted to include speculative harm or only "potential injury," 121
stating, "that a protected animal could have eaten the leaves of a fallen tree
or could, perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches is not sufficient
under the regulation. Instead, ... the regulation requires demonstrable effect
(i.e., actual injury or death) on actual, individual members of the protected
species." 122 She asserted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit incorrectly interpreted the law in PaliZa Il123 by holding,
that a state agency committed a "taking" by permitting
mouflon sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that, when full
grown, might have fed and sheltered endangered palila . . .
m /d. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117
/d. at 709.
118
/d. at 709, 711.
119
/d. at710-11.
120
/d. at 709-10.
121
/d. at 711.
122
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123
Palila v. Haw. Dept. of Land & Natural Res., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
116
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[because] [d]estruction of the seedlings did not proximately
cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it merely
prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently
sustaining actual birds. 124
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter
case that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued
that the FWS regulation defining "harm" was an unreasonable interpretation
of the ESA 125 and therefore was invalid under the ESA. Justice Scalia also
argued in his dissenting opinion that the ESA' s takings prohibitions require
an affirmative act 126 that kills or causes physical harm to particular individual
animals, 127 that is "done directly and intentionally (not indirectly and by
accident) to particular animals (not populations of animals)." 128
Justice Scalia argued in his dissenting opinion that the FWS
regulation defining "harm" violates the ESA because of "three features." 129
First, he argued that the regulation violated the ESA because it is not subject
to ordinary principles of proximate causation and foreseeability, only requiring that an act be the cause-in-fact of death or injury to wildlife. 130
Second, he argued that the regulation also violated the ESA because it
applies to omissions as well as to affirmative acts. 131 Third, Justice Scalia
argued that the regulation violated the ESA, because it applies to "injuries"
inflicted upon populations of a protected species 132 such as by impairment of
breeding and reproduction that prevents an animal from bearing offspring. 133
Justice Scalia disagreed with Justice O'Connor's assertion that
impairment of an animal's breeding is "harm" under the FWS regulation,
arguing that "injures" under the FWS regulation requires physical harm to an
individual, presently-living animal and does not include an injury to a
population of animals. 134 Justice Scalia further argued in his dissenting
opinion that when impairment of an animal's breeding occurs, the only
124

Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 713-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

125

/d. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

126

!d. at 715-16.
/d. at 734 n. 5.
128
/d. at 718.
129
!d. at 715.
130
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 715-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131
!d. at 716.
132
!d. at 716.
133 /d.
134
/d. at 734 n.5.
127
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"injury" that occurs is either harm to the unborn potential issue of the animal
or "psychic harm,"- which he contends are not within the scope of the term
"injures" in the FWS regulation defining "harm." 135
Justice Scalia would interpret the FWS regulation defining "harm" as
not making impairment of breeding, feeding, or sheltering of members of a
protected species of wildlife by itself a form of injury; instead, he considers
such impairment of an essential behavioral pattern as only "one of the modes
of 'kill[ing] or injur[ing] wildlife' .'' 136

N.

INTERPRETATION OF THE FWS REGULATION DEFINING "HARM"

The requirement in the FWS regulation defining "harm," that an act
"actually kill or injure" protected wildlife, might be interpreted as applying
only to an affirmative act that proximately and forseeably causes death or
injury to a member of a protected species, and as not applying to an omission
or failure to act (even when the omission proximately and forseeably causes
death or injury to a protected animal). However, commentary issued by FWS,
in conjunction with the promulgation of its regulation defining "harm," 137
states that the word "act" in the regulation should be defined to include both
commissions (affirmative acts) and omissions. 138 Alternatively, the United
States, in the Brief for the Petitioner that it filed with the United States
Supreme Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 139 asserted that a person's omission should be considered to
be an "act" under the FWS regulation defining "harm" only when the person
had a "legal duty to act" to prevent death or injury to members of protected
species. 140
In addition, the word "actually" in the regulation might be interpreted
to mean that the regulation only applies when a killing or injury of a
protected animal actually has occurred in the past or is occurring at the
present time, and as not applying to a proposed future action that will, or
probably will, kill or injure a protected animal in the future. 141 However, the
Jd.
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 734 (footnote omitted) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (Nov. 4,
1981).
138
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139
.515 u.s. 687 (1995).
140
/d. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Petitioner, at 47).
141
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1063-66 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
13S

136
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regulation not only applies to acts that in the past killed or injured protected
wildlife and to continuing acts that presently are killing or injuring wildlife,
but, as discussed below, also applies to proposed future actions that probably
(to a reasonable certainty) will kill or injure protected wildlife in the future.
When a person ·in the past committed, or currently commits, a
violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions, the person is subject under the
ESA both to civil penalties 142 and to criminal penalties (that can include
imprisonment). 143 In addition, the ESA authorizes a court to issue an
injunction against a currently ongoing action that is violating the ESA's
takings prohibitions, prohibiting the continuation of an ongoing action that
is violating the ESA's takings prohibitions. 144
Courts also have interpreted the ESA and the FWS regulation
defining "harm" to authorize federal district courts to issue an injunction to
halt a proposed future action that is reasonably certain in the future to cause
imminent "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA. 145 A court,
however, will not enjoin a proposed future action that allegedly will "harm"
a protected animal in violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions unless there
is a showing that the proposed future action sought to be enjoined actually
will kill or injure members of a protected species in the future. 146 An
injunction can be issued by a court to halt a proposed action that in the future
probably will cause a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA, without any
proof that the action caused a prohibited taking in the past or is causing a
prohibited taking at the present time. 147 An injunction cannot be issued under
the ESA to halt a proposed future action, however, when there is only a

u.s. 1108 (1997).
142

16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(l) (2000).
/d. § 1540(b)(l).
144
In both United States v. Town ofPlymouth, Mass., 6F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998), and
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla.
1995), the court issued a preliminary injunction against a local governmental entity that
prohibited a governmental entity from continuing to permit certain driving of privatelyowned motor vehicles on public beaches, because such driving of motor vehicles was
causing takings of animals in violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions.
14
' Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2000); Marbled Murre let,
83 F.3d at 1066; Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784-85
(9th Cir. 1995); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 92 F. Supp. 2d
1296, 1301-02 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt Agency,
11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 552 (D. V.I. 1998); Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F. Supp. at 1180.
146
Defenders ofWildlife, 204 F.3d at 925; Strahan v. Linnon, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314
*13 n.6 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998); Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
147
Marbled Murre let, 83 F.3d at 1064-65; Forest Conservation Council, SO F.3d at 783-84.
143
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speculative possibility that the action in the future may kill a member of a
protected species by modifying habitat of the species. 148 In American Bald
Eagle v. Bhatti, 149 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
refused to issue an injunction that would in the future halt deer hunting that
allegedly would result in bald eagles being harmed by eating deer shot by
hunters and ingesting lead slugs (fired by hunters) in the deer carcasses,
because the court held that there had been no showing that any bald eagles
had been harmed by consumption of lead slugs when eating deer carcasses
shot by hunters who fired the lead slugs. The court stated that "[c]ourts have
granted injunctive relief[under the ESA's takings prohibitions] only [if] the
alleged activity has actually harmed the species or ... will actually, as
opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species." 150 The court held in Bhatti
that a one-in-a million risk of harm to bald eagles from deer hunting was
insufficient to invoke the protection of the ESA' s takings prohibitions and to
enjoin future hunting of deer. 151 The First Circuit later explained in another
case 152 that under Bhatti "a risk of harm to endangered species-even a
significant risk of harm-does not support an injunction under the ESA ..
. . Rather, we have required a showing that the activity, if continued, will
actually, as opposed to potentially, cause harm to the species." 153
Under the FWS regulation defining "harm," the modification or
degradation of the habitat of a protected species of wildlife, by itself, does
not constitute a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA when the habitat
modification or degradation does not actually kill or injure protected
wildlife. 154 In order for habitat modification or degradation to constitute a
violation of the ESA' staking prohibitions under the FWS regulation defining
"harm," the habitat modification or degradation must actually kill or injure
one or more existing animals that are members of a protected listed
endangered or threatened species. 155
148

American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9F.3d 163, 166-67 n.5 (lstCir. 1993); Strahan, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16314, at *13 n.6.
149
9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993).
ISO fd. at 166.
tst /d. at 167 n.5.
1 2
s Strahan, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, at *13.
13
s /d. at *13 n.6.
154
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a.Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,691 n.2,
705-06 (1995); Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424, 430 (S.D. Ala. 1992).
tss Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 691 n.2, 696 n.9, 706; Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v.
United States Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1238 {9th Cir. 2001); Defenders of Wildlife
v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 925 {9th Cir. 2000); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060,
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FWS added the word "actually" before "kills or injures" in its
regulation defining "harm" in order to emphasize that habitat modification
alone, without consequent killing or injury of a protected animal, does not
constitute "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA. 156 The
word "actually" in the FWS regulation defining harm does not require,
however, that an injury or killing be established to one hundred percent
certainty or to meet any other burden of proof higher than the traditional civil
standard of preponderance of the evidence. 157
Although the ESA's takings prohibitions might be interpreted as
being violated only when more than one protected animal is harmed,
(because of the ESA' s takings prohibitions requirement that there be a taking
of "any ... [endangered] species [of fish or wildlife]" 158 and the FWS "harm"
regulation's requirement that "wildlife" be "actually killed or injured"), the
courts have held that a person violates the ESA's takings prohibitions by
committing an act that proximately and forseeably causes the death or injury
of even one member of a species of fish or wildlife that is listed as
endangered or threatened under the ESA. 159
An act does not have to threaten a species with extinction in order to
"harm" and "take" members of a protected species in violation of the ESA. 160
However, an act that in the future will cause the extinction of a listed species
protected by the ESA' s takings prohibitions "harms" members of the species
and violates the ESA's takings prohibitions. 161
1065 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997); Forest Conservation Council v.
Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995).
156
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (Nov. 4, 1981).
157
Sean C. Skaggs, Judicial Interpretation ofSection 9 ofthe Endangered Species Act Before
and After Sweet Home: More of the Same, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, supra note 21, at
253, 277-78.
158
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(l)(B),(C) (2000).
159
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 (1998);
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington N. R.R. Inc., 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998); Loggerhead Turtle v. County
Council ofVolusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
160
Nat'/ Wildlife Fed'n, 23 F.3d at 1508; Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F. Supp. at 1180; Swan
View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992).
161
Justice Stevens, in his opinion for the Court in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), implied in dicta that "harm" would
occur under the FWS regulation defining "harm" when "an activity, such as draining a pond,
would actually result in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its habitat." !d. at 699700. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in that case, argued:
[t]o raze the last remaining ground on which the piping
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Furthermore, in a decision issued prior to the Supreme Court's Sweet
Home Chapter decision, one federal district court 162 held that an act of habitat
modification that prevents the recovery of a protected species is a prohibited
taking in violation of the ESA. 163 This holding may no longer be valid under
the Sweet Home Chapter decision, if the holding was based upon a theory
that habitat modification that retards a species' recovery is "harm" and a
prohibited "taking" because it injures the species' population, since the Court
has now interpreted the FWS regulation defining "harm" to require "injury
to particular animals ... " 164
In the Sweet Home Chapter case, Justice Stevens, in his majority
opinion for the Court, held that in order for an act to be found to be a taking
in violation of the ESA under the FWS regulation defining "harm," the death
or injury of one or more "particular" animals must be found to have been

plover currently breeds, thereby making it impossible
for any piping plovers to reproduce, would obviously
injure the population (causing the species' extinction in
a generation). But by completely preventing breeding,
it would also injure the individual living bird, in the
same way that sterilizing the creature injures the living
bird.
/d. at 709-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Palila v. Hawaii Department ofLand & Natural
Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (Palila II), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that habitat destruction that would result in the extinction of a
protected species of wildlife causes "harm" within the meaning of the FWS regulation
defining "harm." /d. at 1110. However, Justice 0' Connor asserted in her concurring opinion
in the Sweet Home Chapter case that this Ninth Circuit decision was wrongfully decided
under the FWS regulation defining "harm" because no actual death or injury to "identifiable
birds" was caused, only prevention of "the regeneration of forest land not currently
sustaining actual birds." 515 U.S. at 714 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit has
concluded, however, that in the Sweet Home Chapter case five Justices of the United States
Supreme Court affirmed Palila II "in all respects." Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Moseley, 80
F.3d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996).
162
Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), affd on
other grounds, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988).
163
649 F. Supp. at 1077. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on different grounds and
did not address the issue of whether an act that prevents recovery of a species "harms"
members of the species. 852 F.2d at 1110-11.
164
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13.
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caused by the act. 165 Justice Stevens, however, did not explain how this
"particular animal" requirement should be interpreted.
Although Justice Scalia asserted, in his dissenting opinion in the
Sweet Home Chapter case, 166 that the FWS regulation defining "harm"
violates the ESA by "encompass[ing] injury inflicted, not only upon
individual animals, but upon populations of the protected species," Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in the case, disagreed with Justice
Scalia's reasoning that "the regulation must contemplate application to a
population of animals which would otherwise have maintained or increased
its numbers." 167 Justice O'Connor stated that in her view, "the regulation is
limited by its terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual
animals." 168 She stated that "[a]t one level, I could not reasonably quarrel
with [Justice Scalia's] observation [that the regulation encompasses injury
inflicted upon populations of a protected species]; death to an individual
animal always reduces the size of the population in which it lives, and in that
sense, 'injures' that population." 169 However, she the stated that "by its
insight, the dissent means something else," 170 explaining:
Building upon the regulation's use of the word "breeding,"
Justice Scalia suggests that the regulation facially bars
significant habitat modification that actually kills or injures
hypothetical animals (or, perhaps more aptly, causes potential
additions to the population not to come into being). Because
"[i]mpairment of breeding does not 'injure' living creatures,"
165

!d. ("The dissent [of Justice Scalia] incorrectly asserts that the Secretary's ["harm"]
regulation ... 'fail[s] to require injury to particular animals,' post, at 731."). Justice
O'Connor, who joined Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Sweet Home Chapter, stated in
her concurring opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case that "the challenged regulation is
limited to significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or
speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals." /d. at 708-09 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). United States v. West Coast Forest Resources Ltd. Partnership, 2000 WL
298707, *5 (D. Ore. March 13, 2000), held that in order for the United States to obtain a
permanent injunction against a ninety-four acre timber harvest that allegedly would take two
spotted owls protected under the ESA, there would have to be evidence of the imminent
"death or actual injury of an identifiable species. 'Mere speculation' is not sufficient. ... "
166
515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167
/d. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(quoting Justice Scalia's dissent, id. at 716 (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
168
!d. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring)~
169 /d.
170 /d.
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Justice Scalia reasons, the regulation must contemplate
application to "a population of animals which would
otherwise have maintained or increased its numbers." 171
Justice O'Connor stated that she disagreed with Justice Scalia 172
because she did "not read the regulation's 'breeding' reference ... to suggest
that the regulation contemplates extension to nonexistent animals." 173 She
also concluded that significant impairment of breeding of a living animal
does injure that living anima1. 174
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter
case does not explicitly discuss this issue of whether the FWS regulation
defining "harm" encompasses "injury to a population" of protected animals.
However, Justice Stevens stated that he disagreed with Justice Scalia's
assertion that the FWS regulation defining "harm" does not require injury to
"particular animals," 175 implicitly rejecting Justice Scalia's assertion that the
regulation encompasses "injury" to a "population" of animals.
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in the Sweet Home Chapter
case also does not address explicitly two issues. The first unanswered
question is whether the ESA's takings prohibitions and the FWS regulation
defining "harm" protect a presently-existing unborn fetus that is not born
alive because of habitat modification. The other unaddressed issue is whether
the same laws protect a so-called "hypothetical" animal that is not presently
living (which was not conceived and born in the future because habitat
modification impaired the breeding of living animals).
Neither the ESA's takings prohibitions nor the FWS regulation defining "harm" indicate whether an animal fetus that has not been born alive
and is not presently living can be "taken" in violation of the ESA. For
instance, are the ESA's takings prohibitions violated when habitat
modification destroys an unhatched bird or mammal egg prior to the live
birth of the fetus within the egg, or when a pregnant female animal suffers
a miscarriage or gives birth to a stillborn fetus? In other words, is an unborn
fetus a "species" and "wildlife" that is protected under the takings
171

/d.

172

Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173
/d. at 710.
174

/d. at 709-10. Justice O'Connor's position, that significant impairment of breeding of a
living animal "harms" that animal within the meaning of the FWS regulation defining
"harm," is discussed infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
175
/d. at 700 n.13.
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prohibitions of the ESA and the FWS regulation defining "harm"? This
question presents an issue similar to that involved in litigation involving the
constitutionality of state statutes prohibiting the abortion of an unborn human
fetus. The United States Supreme Court held, in Roe v. Wade, 176 that an
unborn human fetus is not a "person" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because the Supreme Court
is unlikely to interpret the ESA and the FWS regulation defining "harm" as
affording animal fetuses greater protection than the United States
Constitution affords to human fetuses, the FWS regulation defining "harm"
should be interpreted as not protecting fetuses that are not born alive, and as
protecting only "particular" or "individual" existing animals that have been
born alive.
However, neither the ESA's takings prohibitions nor the FWS
regulation defining "harm" indicate whether the ESA's takings prohibitions
protect animals not presently living, that are not conceived and born because
of habitat modification that impairs breeding by presently-living animals.
Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case,
argued that the definition of "injures" under the FWS regulation defining
"harm" protects animals that are not presently living but which are not
conceived or not born as a result of impairment of breeding by living
creatures. 177 Justice O'Connor, however, stated that "the regulation requires
demonstrable effect (i.e., actual injury or death) on actual, individual
members of the protected species," 178 and that she does " ... not read the
regulation's 'breeding' reference . . . to suggest that the regulation
contemplates extension to nonexistent animals." 179 Justice O'Connor,
therefore would not interpret the FWS regulation defining "harm" to
encompass "injury" to "hypothetical" animals that might have been
conceived and born in the future if habitat modification had not significantly
impaired the breeding of particular presently-living animals. But the majority
opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case does not explicitly address this issue
of whether the ESA's takings prohibitions protect so-called "hypothetical"
animals who are not conceived or born because of the impairment of the
breeding by presently living animals.
410 u.s. 113, 158 (1973).
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178
/d. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179
/d. at 710.
176

177
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Such "hypothetical" animals have not been born and cannot be
identified, and therefore probably cannot be considered "particular" animals
within the meaning of Justice Stevens' majority opinion for the Court in the
Sweet Home Chapter case. Consequently, the FWS regulation defining
"harm" should not be interpreted as protecting such "hypothetical" unborn
animals.
Another issue not addressed by any of the Justices of the Supreme
Court in the Sweet Home Chapter case is what type of evidence is required
to show that a "particular" or "identifiable" living animal(s) has been killed
or injured and therefore taken in violation of the ESA. There are several
different types of evidence that may be sufficient to establish that a
"particular" or "identifiable" animal has been killed or injured and taken in
violation of the ESA. In some cases, where a protected animal has already
been killed by an act of a person, the prohibited taking may be proven by
admission of the body of the dead animal (or of a film or video of the body)
or by testimony of a witness who observed the animal's dead body after it
was illegally taken.
In a case involving allegations that a proposed future activity will
modify wildlife "habitat" within a particular area of land and will "harm" and
"take" one or more animals protected by the ESA, proof of a violation of the
ESA' s takings prohibitions should be able to be established by the admission
of evidence that establishes ( 1) that one or more members of a protected
species of wildlife presently are using the particular area for essential
behavioral purposes (e.g. breeding, feeding or sheltering, thus establishing
that the area is "habitat" for one or more protected animals) and (2) that the
proposed future modification ofthis habitat actually will kill or injure one or
more of these animals who presently are using this area as habitat.
In such a case, a court should not require either evidence of the
precise number of members of the species using the area as habitat, or
evidence establishing the physical markings or characteristics of each
member of the species using the area as habitat. Furthermore, a court in this
situation should not require evidence that establishes the identity of the
particular animal(s) that actually will be killed or injured in the future as a
proximate result of the habitat modification. Instead, the requirement that
there be actual death or injury of "particular" or "identifiable" living animals
should be considered to be satisfied by evidence that shows that one or more
protected animals presently are using a particular area as "habitat" and that
future modification ofthat habitat is reasonably certain (more likely than not)
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to cause the death or injury of one or more of these protected animals that
presently are using the area as habitat. 180
The second sentence of the FWS regulation defining "harm," in
addition, to requiring that habitat modification or degradation "actually kill
or injure wildlife," also requires that the habitat modification or degradation
be "significant" and that the habitat modification or degradation kill or injure
wildlife "by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 181 Yet the FWS regulation defining "harm"
provides no definition of either "significant" or "significantly impairing" for
the purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm" and does not provide
any criteria for determining if habitat modification or degradation is
"significant" or if essential behavioral patterns have been "significantly"
impaired.
By defining "harm" to include only "significant" habitat modification
or degradation where it actually kills or injures protected wildlife, the FWS
regulation defining "harm" implies that habitat modification or degradation
that actually kills or injures protected wildlife nevertheless could be found
not to be "significant" and therefore found not to be "harm" and a prohibited
taking in violation of the ESA. The wording of the regulation also might be
interpreted to require that the "significant" habitat modification or
degradation both (1) proximately cause "significant" impairment of a
species' essential behavioral patterns and (2) proximately cause the actual
killing or injury of one or more animals that are members of a species of
wildlife protected by the ESA by significantly impairing such essential

180

See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1108 (1997) (Evidence that endangered marbled murrelet birds had been detected
approximately one hundred times in a particular ninety-four acre forested area over a recent
three-year period throughout the birds' breeding periods, with many of the instances of
detection indicating that marbled murrelet birds were nesting in the area, as well as witness
testimony that proposed modification of this marbled murrelet habitat by future timber
harvesting "would likely harm marbled murrelets by impairing their breeding and increasing
the likelihood of attack by predators on the adult murrelets as well as the young," id. at 106768, resulted in the Ninth Circuit affirming the District Court's injunction against the future
harvesting of timber in this marbled murrelet habitat because this activity was reasonably
certain to cause "harm" in the future to protected marbled murrelet birds. Neither the district
court nor the Ninth Circuit required specific physical identification of the either the birds that
presently used the area as habitat or the birds that probably would be killed or injured if the
area was logged in the future.).
181
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
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behavioral patterns. 182 Under such an interpretation, the FWS regulation
defining "harm" would not apply to "significant" habitat modification or
degradation that does not "significantly" impair essential behavioral patterns,
even if the significant habitat modification or degradation actually is the
proximate cause of the killing or injury of an animal protected by the ESA' s
takings prohibitions.
In order to further the purposes of the ESA, the FWS regulation
defining "harm" should be interpreted to include, within the definition of
"harm," any act that actually kills or injures a protected endangered or
threatened animal as a proximate result of any habitat modification or
degradation that impairs any essential behavioral pattern of the protected
animal. In other words, any habitat modification or degradation that
proximately causes actual death or injury to a protected animal should be
considered to be "significant" for purposes of the FWS regulation defining
"harm," and impairment of a protected animal's breeding, feeding, sheltering
or other essential behavioral pattern that actually kills or injures a protected
animal should be considered to be "significant impairment" of an essential
behavioral pattern of the animal. The FWS regulation should be interpreted
in this manner because such an interpretation provides greater protection to
listed endangered and threatened species of wildlife than other interpretations
of the regulation and is the interpretation of the regulation that best furthers
Congress' intent "that '[t]ake' [be] defined ... in the broadest possible
manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or
attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." 183
If habitat modification or degradation that "actually kills or injures
wildlife" is not considered to be "harm" for purposes of the FWS regulation
defining harm, (because it either is not considered to be "significant" or is
considered not to have caused significant impairment of an essential
behavioral pattern of a protected animal) the habitat modification or
alteration might be considered to be "harm" under the first sentence of the

182

As discussed infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text, the FWS regulation defining
"harm" should be interpreted to require significant habitat modification that both (1)
significantly impairs an essential behavioral pattern of one or more protected animals and (2)
actually kills or injures these animals. Under this interpretation, significant impairment of
an animal's breeding, feeding, or sheltering by itself does not constitute "injury" and "harm"
to a protected animal under the regulation. Infra note 219 and accompanying text.
183
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704
(1995), quoting S. REP. 93-307, at 7 (1973).
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FWS regulation, as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife." 184 In
order for such an interpretation to be valid, the word "includes'' in the second
sentence of the regulation defining "harm" would have to be interpreted to
mean that the inclusion of habitat modification and alteration in the secorid
sentence of the regulation is not the exclusive means by which habitat
modification or alteration can be found to be "harm" under the regulation.
The explicit inclusion of habitat modification and alteration in the second
sentence of the regulation defining "harm" should be interpreted, however,
as implying the FWS' intent to define habitat modification or alteration as
"harm" only if the habitat modification or alteration satisfies the criteria of
the second sentence of the regulation.
Under the wording of the second sentence of the FWS regulation
defining "harm," an act that significantly modifies or alters the habitat of
members of a listed endangered or threatened species of wildlife does not
have to take place within the "habitat" of the protected animal that is killed
or injured by the habitat modification or alteration. The second sentence of
the FWS regulation only"requires that the act must significantly modify or
degrade habitat of a protected animal and proximately and forseeably cause
the killing or injury of one or more of these protected animals 185 by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns. The regulation does not
require that the act take place within the geographical boundaries of the
"habitat" 186 of the animal(s) allegedly taken in violation of the ESA. The
second sentence of the FWS regulation defining "harm" is not worded in a
manner that requires that significant habitat modification or degradation be
caused by an act taking place within or on the "habitat" that is modified or
degraded; the regulation only requires that an act significantly modify or
degrade wildlife habitat and actually kill or injure protected wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns. An act occurring outside
the geographical boundaries of an animal's "habitat" therefore can be a
prohibited taking of a protected animal in violation of the ESA if the act
proximately and forseeably causes significant modification or degradation
of the habitat of the animal, significant impairment of essential behavioral
patterns of the animal and the killing or injury of the animal. An example of
such an act would be detonation of explosives on land adjacent to habitat of
184

50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 687, 700 n.l3 (1995).
186
The definition of "habitat" of a protected animal, for purposes of the FWS regulation
defining "harm," is discussed infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
185
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a protected species that proximately and forseeably causes the nest of a
protected bird to fall to the ground, causing the death of recently hatched
offspring of the bird. Another example would be the run-off of toxic
pollutants from a development site into nearby waters that are the habitat of
protected fish, causing the death of the fish. 187
A.

Definition of "Habitat"

When a taking of a protected animal in violation of the ESA is
alleged to have been caused by modification or degradation of the animal's
habitat, the "habitat" of the animal has to be defined geographically, and the
act that allegedly is a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA must be
proven to be the proximate and foreseeable cause of significant modification
or degradation of that habitat. 188
"Habitat" has to be established individually for each animal that
allegedly has been taken in violation of the ESA by significant habitat
modification or degradation. However, the FWS regulation defining "harm"
does not define a protected animal's "habitat," and the courts have not
adopted a general definition of "habitat" for purposes of the regulation.
Should a person commit an act that proximately and forseeably
causes the death or injury of a protected animal by modifying or degrading
land or an ecosystem that is not shown to have actually been the "habitat" of
the animal at the time of the animal's death or injury, the act of the person
nevertheless could be found to be "harm" under the first sentence of the FWS
regulation defining "harm" because the person did an act that actually killed
187

See generally Morrill v. Lujan, 802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992), and Hawksbill Sea
Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529 (D. V.I. 1998) (addressing
claims that alleged that takings of protected animals in violation of the ESA would be
proximately caused by modification of habitat of wildlife protected by the ESA, both by acts
that would take place within the geographical boundaries of the animals' habitat and by acts
that would take place outside the geographical boundaries of the habitat). In these two cases,
the courts rejected all of the takings claims on the grounds that there had been no showing
that any of the acts (either those occurring within the "habitat" or those outside the "habitat")
would proximately cause any killing or injury to any protected wildlife. Neither of these two
decisions, however, explicitly addressed the issue of whether "harm" under the regulation
can be caused by an act that occurs outside an animal's "habitat."
188
See generally Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 687,697 n.9, 700 n.13; Morrill v. Lujan,
802 F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Ala. 1992); United States v. West Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship,
2000 WL 298707 (D. Ore. 2000).
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or injured a protected animal. Although the person would not have
committed an act that significantly modified or degraded "habitat" of the
animal that was killed or injured (within the meaning of the second sentence
of the FWS regulation defining "harm"), the person's act of modifying land
or an ecosystem would constitute "harm" under the first sentence of the
regulation if the act was the proximate and foreseeable cause of the killing
or injury of a protected animal-and the person therefore would be liable for
a prohibited taking of the animal in violation of the ESA.
Under the FWS regulation defining "harm," the "habitat" of a
particular animal should be defined as the geographical area where the
animal engages in "essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding,
or sheltering." 189 In other words, a particular animal's "habitat" for purposes
of the FWS regulation defining "harm" is the animal's range 190-the
geographical area where the animal presently goes and probably will go in
the future to obtain food (either for itself or its mate or offspring}, to
conceive, bear or raise its young, or to obtain shelter for sleep, rest or
protection from predators or natural forces (weather) for itself or for its mate
or offspring- on a regular or frequent basis, rather than on a one-time basis.
Under this approach, modification or degradation of land that
presently is not being used by a protected animal for essential behavioral
patterns (breeding, feeding or sheltering) and that probably (more likely than
not) will not be used in .the future by the animal for .such purposes, is not
"habitat" for the animal for purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm."
Modification or degradation of land that is not inhabited by a protected
animal cannot be "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA,
even if the land is suitable for breeding, feeding or sheltering by the animal
or members of its species. 191
The habitat of a particular animal protected by the ESA, that is a
member of a specific pack, flock or family of those animals, may be different
from the habitat of other animals that are members of the same species who
are members of a different pack, flock or family, because the particular range
of that animal may differ from the range of other members of its species.
189

50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
Robert J. Taylor, Biological Uncertainty in the Endangered Species Act, 8 NAT.
REsOURCES & ENV'T 6, 8-9 (1993) (discussing the range and habitat of a number of different
migratory species of wildlife).
191
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713-14
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190

2003]

AFTERMATH OF SWEET HOME CHAPTER

571

Animals in different packs, flocks or families may well use different
geographical areas to obtain food or prey or shelter for themselves, their
mates, or their offspring, and thus may have different "habitats" for purposes
of the FWS regulation defining "harm."
Of course, when particular land or an ecosystem that serves as the
habitat for a number of animals of the same protected species is modified or
degraded by a particular act, each and every one of these protected animals
may be the victim of a taking prohibited by the ESA if each animal is
actually either killed or injured by the act within the meaning of the FWS
regulation defining "harm." Where the habitat of a number of animals in a
pack, flock, or family is significantly modified or degraded, each member of
the pack, flock, or family must be actually killed or injured by the habitat
modification or degradation in order for each member of the pack, flock, or
family to be the victim of a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA.
A court should permit both direct and circumstantial evidence to be
introduced to be used to establish that particular land or a particular
ecosystem is the "habitat" of a particular animal, for purposes of the FWS
regulation defining "harm" and the ESA's takings prohibitions. The best
direct evidence in support of a claim that a particular geographical area is the
habitat of a particular animal would be the testimony of a person (especially
a trained biologist) who firsthand visually· observed, heard or otherwise
detected that animal engaged in conduct or behavior in that area that is
associated with breeding, feeding, sheltering or other essential behavioral
patterns. Examples of such firsthand observations of essential behavior in a
particular area would be observation (firsthand or by means of a camera, film
or video) of a particular animal engaged in obtaining food in the area,
sheltering in a nest, den or burrow in the area, acts of reproduction, or
bearing or caring for offspring in that area. 192 Of course, one time observation
of a particular animal in a particular geographical area probably is not
sufficient to establish that the area is the "habitat" of the animal, because the
animal's presence in the area that one time may be the result of many
different things. For instance, that animal may only be fleeing through that
area to escape a predator or natural forces (such as a wildfire) or traveling
through that area while seeking new habitat to use for breeding, feeding or
192

See generally Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (N.D.
Cal. 1995), a.ffd, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997)
(determining that protected birds were using a particular area for shelter, based on a trained
observor hearing distinctive bird calls and sounds associated with sheltering).
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sheltering. On the other hand, if a particular animal is observed physically
present in a particular area a number of times over a substantial period of
time, the repeated presence of the animal in that area over a substantial
period of time should be circumstantial evidence that the animal is using that
area for feeding, breeding, or sheltering and that the area is part of the
"habitat" of that animal.
A particular geographical area also should be found to be the habitat
of one or more members of a specific protected species if one or more
members of the protected species are observed visually or by hearing
engaged in conduct associated with use of the area for breeding, feeding or
sheltering, without the need to physically identify, by distinctive markings
or features, the specific animals who are using the area for breeding, feeding,
or sheltering. 193
In some cases, the movements of a particular protected animal, that
allegedly is the victim of a taking in violation of the ESA, can be tracked by
radiotelemetry because the animal already has a transmitting device attached
to it. In such a case, the radiotelemetry data, along with physical inspection
of the areas where the radiotelemetry data indicate the animal has been (to
look for evidence of feeding, breeding or sheltering by that animal), can
provide data establishing that the animal is using a particular area for
essential behavioral purposes and establish that the area is "habitat" for the
particular animal. 194 Of course, caution should be exercised before attaching
a radiotelemetry device to a particular protected animal solely for the
purposes of determining the animal's "habitat" and whether the animal is the
victim of a prohibited taking in violation of the ESA.
Circumstantial evidence that should be sufficient to establish that a
particular geographical area is the habitat of one or more animals that are
members of a protected species would include evidence that prey of that
species was recently killed or devoured in that area by a member of the
protected species. The recent killing of prey in that area by a member of the
193

See generally id. As discussed supra notes 164-80 and infra notes 220-22 and
accompanying text, one or more animals should be able to be found to be the victim of a
prohibited taking in violation of the ESA without the animal being identified by specific
distinctive markings or features.
194
See United States v. West Coast Forest Res. Ltd. P'ship, 2000 WL 298707 (D. Ore. 2000)
(requiring the United States to provide radio telemetry data from two protected owls, and
data establishing actual use of a particular area by the two owls, in support of the federal
government's request for a permanent injunction against planned harvesting of timber on the
ninety-four acre area, that allegedly would "take" the two owls in violation of the ESA).
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species would establish that the area presently is used by some members of
the species for feeding and therefore is "habitat" for some members of the
species. Alternatively, the discovery in the area of a presently-used burrow,
den, or nest of the type used by members of the protected species also should
be sufficient circumstantial evidence that the area presently is used for
sheltering by some members of the protected species and therefore is
"habitat" of some members of that species. Such circumstantial evidence
would be even stronger if members of the protected species were detected
(possibly by recent stool from a member of the species) either within the area
or in the vicinity of the area where feeding or sheltering by members of the
species appears to be occurring at the present time, particularly if some
members of the species recently were observed coming from the direction of
that area.
Even when a presently-used shelter or nest of members of a particular
protected species is not found within a particular area, circumstantial
evidence that members of the species are sheltering (nesting) in that area
exists when that area contains the type of flora that is used by members of
that species for shelter (nests) and there also is visual or auditory detection
of the presence in that area of members of the species engaged in behavior
that biologists associate with use of the area by members of the species for
sheltering (nesting). 195
Of course, in order for "harm" and a prohibited taking in violation of
the ESA to occur, there also has to be an act significantly modifying or
degrading the "habitat" which actually "kills" or "injures" a member of the
protected species by significantly impairing an essential behavioral pattern
of a member of the species.
B.

Interpretation of "Kills" and "Injures"

Under the FWS regulation defining "harm," a taking of a protected
animal in violation of the ESA can occur if an act "actually" injures a
protected animal, without the animal being killed. The regulation, however,
195

See Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1352-1360 (N.D. Cal.
1995), affd sub nom. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (holding that visual and auditory detection, coupled with actual
observations of "occupied behavior," of protected marbled murrelets in certain parts of a
forested area, which biologists associated with marbled murrelets using the area for nesting
(sheltering), was sufficient evidence to support a finding by the court that members of the
protected marbled murrelet species were using the forested area for nesting (sheltering).).
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neither defines "injures" nor provides any criteria for defining "injures."
Furthermore, Justice Stevens, in his opinion for the Court in Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 196 did not discuss how
"injures" ·should be defined for purposes of the FWS regulation defining
"harm."
"Injures" under the regulation should be defined broadly and should
not be limited only to a serious or permanent physical injury, wound, or
disease. "Injures" certainly should not be limited to a physical injury, wound,
or disease to a particular animal that makes the death of the animal imminent
and probable (reasonably certain to occur, under the more likely than not
preponderance of evidence civil burden of proof) in the near future, because
an act that is reasonably certain to cause the i~nent death of a protected
animal in the future would be considered to "actually kill" the protected
animal within the meaning of the FWS regulation defining "harm." 197
At the present time, however, two opposing interpretations of
"injures" under the FWS regulation defining "harm" have been asserted by
some of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor,
in her concurring opinion in Sweet Home Chapter, 198 indicates that in her
view a presently-living animal is "injured" not only when it is physically
harmed or injured, 199 but also when its breeding is significantly impaired by
destruction of its habitat. 200 She also reasoned that habitat degradation which,
... completely prevent[s] breeding ... would ... injure the
individual living bird in the same way that sterilizing the
creature injures the individual living bird. To "injure" is,
among other things, "to impair" .... [O]ne need not subscribe
to theories of 'psychic harm," cf. post [Justice Scalia's
dissent], at 734-735, n. 5, to recognize that to make it
impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most
essential physical functions and to render that animal, and its
515 u.s. 687 (1995).
Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1108
(1997).
198
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 709-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
199
/d. at 710 ("The regulation has clear application ... to significant habitat modification that
kills or physically injures animals .... ").
200
/d. ("In any event, even if impairing an animal's ability to breed were not, in and of itself,
an injury to that animal, interference with breeding can cause an animal to suffer other,
perhaps more obvious, kinds of injury.").
196

197
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· genetiC-material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is
actual injury.2° 1
Under this interpretation of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in the
Sweet Home Chapter case, a protected animal is "injured" and "harmed"
· when a modification of its habitat significantly impairs the animal's essential
behavioral patterns (such as breeding, feeding, or sheltering),202 without the
need for any attendant physical injury, wound or disease also to be caused by
the habitat modification.
The opposing theory, espoused by Justice Scalia in his dissenting
opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case, would interpret "injures" in the
FWS regulation to mean only physical injurf03 or physical harm. 204 Justice
Scalia, however, did not explain whether he would define "physical injury
or harm" to include a disease as well as a physical injury (such as a wound
or broken limb), or whether he would require a "physical injury or harm" to
be "serious or significant" or permanent, or both. However, under Justice
Scalia's definition of "injures," impairment of breeding, feeding or sheltering
is only " ... one of the modes of 'kill[ing] or injur[ing] wildlife,"'205 but such
impairment of an essential behavioral pattern is not itself an "injury."206
Judges of the United States Courts of Appeals and district courts also
have divided on the issue of how "injures" should be defined for purposes of
the FWS regulation defining "harm," with some judges207 following the
theory that "injures" includes significant impairment of an animal's breeding,
feeding, or sheltering (as well as physical harm or injury), and other judges208
201

/d. This discussion, and her later statement that she does not "read the regulation's
'breeding' reference to vitiate or somehow to qualify the clear actual death or injury
requirement~ .. ," id., might be interpreted to mean that Justice O'Connor requires habitat
modification not only to significantly impair an animal's breeding, but also to "injure" the
animal, such as by completely and permanently preventing breeding by the animal. Under
this interpretation, significant impairment of an animal's breeding by itself would not
"injure" the animal.
202
MarbledMurrelet, 83 F.3d at 1067; Forest Conservation Council v. RosboroLumberCo.,
50 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1995).
203
Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204
/d. at 734 n.5.
205
/d. at 734.
206
/d. at 734 n.5.
207
Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1067; Forest Conservation Council, 50 F.3d at 788.
208
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 553, 554
(D. V.I. 1998); Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923,939 (D. Mont. 1992).
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following Justice Scalia's position that significant impairment of an essential
behavioral pattern by itself is not sufficient to constitute "injury" to an
animal under the regulation.
Different portions of the FWS commentary accompanying its
regulation defining "harm" support both of these two opposing
interpretations of "injures." One portion of the commentary, which states
that "[h]abitat modification as injury would only be covered by the new
definition if it significantly impaired essential behavioral patterns of a listed
species,"209 could be interpreted to mean that significant impairment of an
essential behavioral pattern by itself is an "injury." However, another portion
of the FWS commentary indicates that significant impairment of an essential
behavioral pattern by itself is not an "injury," stating that under the FWS
regulation defining "harm," habitat modification "must be significant, must
significantly impair essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual
injury to a protected wildlife species."210 Another portion of the FWS
commentary also implies that significant impairment of an essential
behavioral pattern by itself is not an "injury," by stating that "[t]he word
'impair' was substituted for 'disrupt' to limit harm to situations where a
behavioral pattern was adversely affected and not simply disturbed on a
temporary basis with no consequent injury to the protected specie~." 211 The
following commentary, that accompanied the FWS' s 1981 proposal to amend
its 1975 regulation defining "harm," also indicates that "injures" should not
be interpreted to include significant impairment of an essential behavioral
pattern by itself:
This [1975] definition [of "harm"] contains a significant
ambiguity. If the words "such effects" are read to refer to the
phrase "significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns,"
then any significant environmental modification or
degradation that disrupts essential behavioral patterns will fall
under the definition of harm, regardless of whether an actual
killing or injuring of a listed species of wildlife is
demonstrated .... In an opinion dated April 17, 1981, the
Solicitor's Office concluded that such a result is inconsistent
with the intent of Congress. 212
209

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (Nov. 4, 1981).
/d. at 750.
211 /d.
212
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (June 2, 1981).
210
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While the FWS 's commentary accompanying its promulgation of its
regulation defining "harm" indicates that significant impairment of an
essential behavioral pattern by itself should not be considered an "injury,"
neither the FWS regulation defining "harm" nor its commentary
accompanying the regulation indicate how "injures" should be defined under
the regulation.
A broad definition of "injures," that is not limited to physical injuries
or harm and expansively protects wildlife from other adverse effects
proximately caused by modifications of habitat, should be adopted for
purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm," because Congress intended
that the ESA' s takings prohibitions should be defined in "the broadest
possible manner," 213 and because a broad definition of"injures" is consistent
with dictionary definitions of "injures" quoted by several Supreme Court
Justices in the Sweet Home Chapter case. 214
The word "injures" should not be interpreted, for purposes of the
FWS regulation defining "harm," to mean only a serious and permanent
physical wound, injury or disease to an identifiable, particular animal.
Rather, a protected animal should be considered to be "injured," "harmed,"
and "taken" in violation of the ESA if it suffers a permanent and serious (but
non-life threatening) 215 physical wound, injury or disease as a result of
habitat modification that significantly impairs the animal's breeding, feeding,
or sheltering.
In addition, even a temporary physical wound, injury or disease
should be considered to be an "injury" under the regulation, because in
unfortunate circumstances such a physical wound, injury or disease may lead
to the premature death of the harmed animal because the wound, injury, or
213

Babbitt v. SweetHomeChapterofCommunities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,704 (1995)
(quoting S. REP. No. 93-307 at 7).
214
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in the case, states that "[t]o 'injure' is, among
other things, 'to impair."' 515 U.S. at 710 (O'Connor, J., concurring), citing WEBSTER's
NINTH NEW COUEGIATE DICfiONARY 623 (1983). Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion
in the case, quoted the following broad dictionary commentary with respect to the word
"injures": "Injure has the widest range ... Harm and hurt refer principally to what causes
physical or mental distress to living things." /d. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoting from
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICfiONARY 662 (1985).
21
s As discussed supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text, an act that probably will result
in -the imrriinent death of an animal in the near future would be an act that "actually kills" the
animal (rather than just an act that only "actually injures" the animal), within the meaning
of the FWS regulation defining harm.
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disease makes the animal more susceptible to further injury or to death from
the natural elements, predators, or other animals with which the harmed
animal may compete for food, mates, or shelter. An example of such an
injury would be a new-born bird suffering a broken leg or wing when a tree
in which its nest (shelter) is located is felled during timber harvesting. This
is true even if the broken leg or wing eventUally heals completely so that the
animal does not die as a result. In addition, temporary loss of an animal's
body weight, caused by habitat modification which adversely affects the
animal's food supply and behavioral feeding patterns, should be considered
to be an "injury" under the FWS regulation defining "harm." Even such a
temporary loss of body weight may make: the animal more vulnerable to
predators and disease by reducing the animal's strength and stamina. The
animal should be considered to be "injured" in such a situation even though
the animal later finds an alternate, adequate food supply and regains its
normal body weight. 216 Furthermore, an animal should be considered to be
"injured" if modification of its habitat causes the animal to fail to conceive
or bear offspring during a particular breeding season by impairing the
animal's normal breeding behavior, thus preventing a female animal from
conceiving new offspringl 17 or causing a pregnant female animal to miscarry
or to have a stillborn birth. An "injury" and "harm" should be considered to
have occurred under the ESA in these cases, even though the animal may be
able to successfully breed and reproduce offspring in future breeding
seasons, because the animal's lack of successful breeding and reproduction
in even one breeding season is contrary to the ESA's goal of achieving
recovery of listed species of wildlife. 218
On the other hand, a protected animal should not be considered to be
"injured" simply because its breeding, feeding or sheltering is significantly
216

See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 554 (D.
V .1. 1998) (Mere destruction of animals that are a food source of a protected animal by itself
is not an "injury" and "harm" to the protected animal, because the animal may have other
sources of that type of food or may have access to other types of food.).
217
See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1271-72 (E.D. Tex. 1988), affd in part and
vacated in part on other grounds sub nom., Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers were harmed by timber
management practices that isolated colonies of the birds within national forests in Texas,
preventing the birds from locating breeding partners).
218
In her concurring opinion in the Sweet Home Chapter case, Justice O'Connor stated that
an animal is "injured" when environmental pollutants degrade the animal's habitat and cause
the animal''to suffer physical complications during gestation." 515 U.S. at 710 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
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impaired. In such a situation, the· animal may.·be able to adapt to this
impairment of its essential behavioral patterns without being killed and
without suffering .any significant adverse. effects. For. example, when a
protected animal's food supply within a habitat is destroyed or reduced, the
animal may be able to find sufficient adequate food for its own needs (thus
maintaining its health and normal body weight) and the heeds of its offspring
and mate. In such a situation, the animal should· not be considered to be
injured even though one of its essential behavioral patterns (its feeding) has
been significantly impaired. 219 Another example of significant impairment
of an essential behavioral pattern that does not "injure" a protected animal
would be where habitat modification temporarily prevents. a protected
animal's attempt to mate and conceive new offspring at a particular time
(such as by causing the animal's prospective mate temporarily to leave a
particular area before mating occurs), when the animal and its prospective
mate successfully mate later during the same breeding season and conceive
and bear new offspring after the unsuccessful initial attempt. Yet another
example of significant impairment of an essential behavioral pattern that
does not "injure" a protected animal would be a situation where a protected
animal's shelter (nest) is destroyed by habitat modification but the animal is
able to establish a new adequate shelter without suffering any adverse effects
(even if the new shelter has to be located outside the animal's present habitat
and range).
As these examples illustrate, for the purposes of the FWS regulation
defining "harm," a particular animal should not be considered to be "injured"
simply because the animal's breeding, feeding, or sheltering has been
significantly impaired by modification of the animal's habitat. Rather, in
order for a particular animal to be considered to be "injured" by habitat
modification, the habitat modification must adversely affect the animal in
some significant way by significantly impairing the animal's breeding,
feeding or sheltering. A significant adverse affect that should be considered
to be an "injury" to a protected animal, however, should include prevention
of conception or birth of new offspring by a particular animal during a
particular breeding season, as well as any adverse impact upon a particular
219

See Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (implying that protected animals are not
"injured" (for purposes of the FWS regulation defining "harm") when the animals' food
supply in a particular habitat is destroyed, and the destroyed food supply has not been shown
to be the animals' only available food supply, because the protected animals "might be able
to seek food somewhere else .... ").
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animal's feeding, or sheltering that makes the animal more susceptible to
death or to a physical injury, wound, or disease from other animals (including
predators) or natural forces. An "injury" under the FWS regulation defining
"harm" should not have to be a life-threatening or permanent physical injury,
wound or disease.
In addition to deciding what types of adverse impacts should be
included within the definition of "injures" for purposes of the FWS
regulation defining "harm," courts also will have to decide what kinds of
evidence will be considered sufficient to establish that habitat modification
has killed or injured particular protected animals. Obviously, the purposes of
the ESA probably will not be served by an evidentiary rule requiring that a
particular protected animal be physically examined (possibly after the animal
is temporarily captured) to determine whether the animal has suffered a
physical wound, injury or disease as a result of significant impairment of an
essential behavioral pattern of the animal that was caused by modification of
the animal's habitat. Even a rule requiring evidence of direct physical
observations by a trained scientist, or by videotape, film or photographs, of
an "injury" to a protected animal (such as observations of the animal's
behavior after the "injury"), may be difficult to satisfy, because many types
of protected wildlife may be difficult to observe visually in their habitat. 220
Consequently, courts should permit the killing or the "injury" of a
protected animal, by modification of the animal's habitat, to be established
by the testimony of an expert scientist giving a learned, expert opinion that
the modification of the habitat of one or more protected animals significantly
is impairing or probably will impair the animals' breeding, feeding or
sheltering and also is causing or probably will cause death or physical injury,
disease or other significant adverse impacts to one or more of the protected
animals that use the habitat. 221
220

See generally Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343, 1354 (N.D.
Cal. 1995), affid sub nom., Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996}, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) ("Nearly 75 to 95 percent of all marbled murrelet detections
in California are audible detections.").
221
See Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1067-68 (This case held that 1) there was sufficient
expert scientific evidence, collected by trained observers who engaged in detections of
marbled murrelet birds in the wild according to an accepted scientific protocol, establishing
that marbled murrelets were using a particular forested area for sheltering and habitat (These
trained observers made approximately one-hundred visual and auditory detections of marbled
murrelets in that area "throughout the birds' breeding season, for a period of three
consecutive years".); and 2) there was sufficient testimony by several expert scientific
witnesses as "to the probability of the murrelets' nesting in [the area] and that
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In addition, a court should hold that there is sufficient evidence that
modification of the habitat of a protected species of wildlife in the past has
killed one or members of the protected species, when there is evidence that
the population of that species in that habitat declined after the modification
of that habitat, without the need to identify specifically the particular animals
killed by the habitat modification. In these cases there should be an absence
of any evidence that the decline of the species' population in that modified
habitat was caused by members of the species being killed by some other
act(s) or by members of the species migrating to a new habitat. 222

V.

PROXIMATE CAUSATION STANDARDS

In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 223 a majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court held
that a prohibited "take" in violation of the ESA can be caused by an indirect
act as well as by a direct act, 224 and that the FWS regulation defining "harm"
is subject to "ordinary requirements of proximate causation and
foreseeability ... [and] 'but for' causation."225
Because under the general common law of torts there can be two or
more proximate causes of a particular injury or harm, 226 two or more persons
therefore each can be held to be the proximate, foreseeable and "but for"
cause of a "take" of a particular animal protected under the takings
prohibitions of the ESA. Each of these persons can be liable under the ESA
for the prohibited taking of one particular animal. An example of such a
situation would be when one person modifies the habitat of a protected
animal, causing that animal to flee its habitat and to go to another area where
implementation of [the] harvesting plan would likely harm marbled murrelets by impairing
their breeding and increasing the likelihood of attack by predators on the adult murrelets as
well as the young;" and 3) significantly impairing the breeding and sheltering of the
protected birds by itself amounted to "harm" under the ESA.).
222
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), a.ff'din part and vacated in part
on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). The facts
and holdings of this case are discussed infra note 231 and in Davison, supra note 48, at 19295.
223
515 u.s. 687 (1995).
224
Jd. at 697-98.
225
Jd. at 700 n.13.
226
Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unraveling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U.
BALT. J. ENV1L. L. 1, 9-10 (1993).
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the animal is shot and killed by a hunter. In such a case, both the hunter (the
direct cause of the animal's death) and the person who modified the animal's
habitat (the indirect cause of the animal's death) commit a taking in violation
of the ESA, because each of these two persons were the proximate,
foreseeable, and "but for" cause ofthe particular animal's death. 227 Another
situation, where two different persons each could be liable under the ESA for
the prohibited taking of one particular animal, is when a private individual
or corporation engages in an act that requires a permit or license issued by
the federal, state or local government and that act forseeably and proximately
causes the death or injury of a particular protected animal in violation of the
ESA's takings prohibitions. In such a case, both the private individual or
corporation (as the direct cause of the taking) and the government that issued
the permit or license (as the indirect cause of the taking) are liable for the
prohibited taking of the one particular animal. 228
Habitat modification may constitute a prohibited taking in violation
of the ESA either when the habitat modification directly kills or injures a
particular protected animal or when the habitat modification indirectly kills
or injures a protected animal. An example of habitat modification directly
and proximately killing a protected animal would be when a lumberjack or
bulldozer fells a tree containing a nest with recently hatched protected birds,
who are killed when their nest crashes to the ground after the felling of the
tree. An example of habitat modification indirectly killing members of a
protected species of wildlife would be when habitat modification destroys the
species' only available food supplies, resulting in the death of all members
of the species in that habitat due to starvation. 229
However, killings or injury of protected wildlife in violation of the
ESA' s takings prohibitions have not necessarily been proximately caused by
modification of the animals' habitat simply because the population of the
particular species in that particular habitat is found to have decreased after
the modification of that habitat has occurred. Some of the decline of the
species' population within the habitat may be due to deaths of some members
of the species due to natural causes (such as age, disease or non-human
227

This example is discussed in Davison, supra note 48, at 190-91.
The liability of the federal, state or local government under the ESA's takings
prohibitions, for authorizing or permitting a taking by another person by issuance of a permit
or license or by inadequately regulating the actions of that other person, is discussed infra
notes 236-52 and accompanying text.
229
This type of situation is discussed in Davison, supra note 48, at 191-92.
228
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predators). On the other hand, such natural deaths of members of the species
may be offset in whole or in part by the birth ·of new offspring within the
habitat,. or by. the migration of members of the species into the habitat.
However, modification of the habitat of the species may reduce the animals'
shelter and food supply, making them more susceptible to being killed by
predators. 230 Habitat modification also may adversely affect the species'
breeding and reproduction, proximately causing a decline of the species'
population because the birth rate fell below the rate of death within the
habitat. 231
Because the ESA seeks to increase the p~pulation of listed
endangered and threatened species of fish and wildlife to levels of recovery
that permit a listed species to be de-listed, the courts should adopt a rule
permitting a finding that habitat modification or degradation has proximately
caused the killings of one or more members of a listed protected species,
when the species' population within the habitat has declined after the
modification or degradation of the habitat and there is no other reasonable
explanation for the decline in the species' population (such as the species'
migration or abnormally high death rates or low birth rates due to natural
forces, disease, or predators). 232 This rule would not apply, and harm or
taking in violation of the ESA would not be found, when a species'
population within a particular habitat either increases or remains the same
despite the modification or degradation of that habitat. 233 However, if there
is evidence that a specific, identifiable animal was killed or injured by an act
230

See generally Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1108 (1997) (finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish that
destruction of marbled murrelet bird habitat by timber harvesting would make both adult and
young murrelets more susceptible to attack by predators).
231
See Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991)(The
court held that a decline in population of the endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers in the
national forests in eastern Texas was proximately caused in part by the decline in the birth
rate of the birds within the national forests that was proximately caused by modification of
the birds' habitat by timber management actions that interfered with the birds' breeding. The
court in Lyng also found that the reduction in woodpecker population within the national
forests was partially caused by a reduction in the birds' food supply and shelter within their
habitat. These findings were made in the absence of any evidence that part or all of the
decline in the woodpecker population in the national forests in eastern Texas was due to the
migration of any woodpeckers to new habitat elsewhere or due to any cause other than the
habitat modification.). See also Davison, supra note 48, at 192-95.
232
This proposed rule is discussed in Davison, supra note 48, at 195-97.
233
Quarles & Lundquist, supra note 77, at 227-29.
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that modified or degraded the animal's habitat, that act would violate the
ESA's takings prohibitions even though the population of the species
increased after the act occurred. 234

VI.

TAKlNGS BY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY AUTHORIZING OR
INEFFECTIVELY REGULATING A TAKlNG BY ANOTHER PERSON

A federal, state, or local governmental entity commits a taking in
violation of the ESA when it issues a permit, license, or other authorization,
that allows or authorizes a person to engage in a particular act that directly
causes, or will directly cause in the future, a prohibited taking of a protected
animal, when that particular act legally could not take place but for the
governmental permit, license or authorization. 235 In such cases, a prohibited
taking of a particular animal in violation of the ESA is considered to have
been proximately caused and committed both by the permittee or licensee
(the person whose governmentally-authorized act directly caused the
prohibited taking) and by the governmental entity that issued the permit,
license or authorization. 236 Such dual liability is consistent with the holding
in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon237 that
the FWS definintion of harm requires compliance with "ordinary
requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability ... [and] 'but for'
causation" because under the traditional common law of torts there can be
two or more "but for" and proximate causes of one particular harm238 and
because it is foreseeable that harm may occur to a protected animal when a
234

See United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding
that prohibited takings in violation of the ESA of threatened piper plover birds had been
proximately caused by the driving of off-road vehicles on public beaches, based upon the
discovery of the dead bodies of several members of the protected species in tire tracks of offroad vehicles, even though the population of the species in the area had increased during the
preceding eight years).
235
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163-64 (lstCir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830 (1998);
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla.
1995); United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81,90 (D. Mass. 1998).
236
Strahan, 127 F.3d at 163. Alternatively, the governmental entity in such a situation may
be considered to have violated section 9(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2002), of the ESA, by
causing the commission of a section 9 violation takings prohibitions by issuing the permit,
license or authorization. Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1996), affd in part
and vacated in part on other grounds, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
830 (1998).
237
515 U.S. 687,700 n.13 (1995).
238
Black & Hollander, supra note 226, at 9-10.

2003]

AFTERMATH OF SWEET HOME CHAPTER

585

governmental entity authorizes or permits another person to engage in an act
that is reasonably certain to harm a protected animal.
Under this principle of governmental liability under the ESA's
takings prohibitions for authorizing an act by another person that takes a
protected animal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held the Commonwealth of Massachusetts liable under the ESA's takings
prohibitions for illegal "takings" of protected whales by private persons
engaged in gillnet and lobster pot fishing in Massachusetts coastal waters,
when such specific acts of fishing were authorized by permits issued by the
Commonwealth and would be illegal under Massachusetts law without such
state permits.239 In support of this holding, the First Circuit reasoned that,
[t]he causation ... while indirect, is not so removed that it
extends outside the realm of causation as it is understood in
the common law .... [l]n this instance the state has licensed
commercial fishing operations to use gillnets and lobster pots
in specifically the manner that is likely to result in a violation
of federal law ... it is not possible for a licensed commercial
fishing operation to use its gillnets or lobster pots in the
manner permitted by the Commonwealth without the risk of
violating the ESA by exacting a taking. Thus, the state's
licensure of gillnet and lobster pot fishing does not involve
the intervening independent actor. 240
Several courts have applied this principle, imposing liability on a
governmental body that authorizes a taking by another person. For example,
local governmental bodies were liable for takings of protected animals
committed directly by privately-owned motor vehicles operating on coastal
beaches with the permission of the local governmental body, when the local
government has authority to regulate the operation of privately-owned motor
vehicles on coastal beaches within its jurisdiction.241
Another court has implicitly applied this principle to hold the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") liable for a prohibited
taking in violation of the ESA caused by protected animals eating strychnine239

Strahan, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 978 (1998).

240

/d. at 164.

241

Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Vol usia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1181-83
(M.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Town of Plymouth, Mass., 6 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Mass.
1998).
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laced rodent bait (that could only be distributed and used because EPA
registered the bait under federal law). 242 Another holding found the
Department of Interior liable for takings of bald eagles· in violation of the
ESA caused by eagles ingesting lead shot when eating prey that had been
killed by hunters shooting lead shot (which the Department authorized
hunters to use in hunting the eagles' prey). 243
A governmental entity is not liable, however, for an ESA-prohibited
taking committed by a person operating a vessel or vehicle, where the
governmental entity merely has permitted or authorized that person to
operate the vessel or vehicle by licensing or registering the vessel or vehicle
and licensed its operator or driver to operate the vessel or vehicle. In such
situations the vessel or vehicle "owner or operator is an independent actor
who is, himself, responsible for complying with environmental and other
laws."244
In dictum, in a case involving the issue of whether a county council
is liable under the ESA for takings of protected sea turtles caused by countyregulated, privately-owned artificial beachfront lighting sources that disorient
and harm turtles on nearby beaches, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit has stated that a local governmental body can be liable
under the ESA for a prohibited taking of a protected animal, which was
242

Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 ·F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989).
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1089 (E.D. Cal. 1985). In addition,
the United States Forest Service has been held liable for takings of protected birds in
violation of the ESA that were caused by private timber companies harvesting timber in
national forests with the authorization of the Forest Service. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F.
Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
244
Strahan v. Linnon, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16314, *14 (1st Cir. July 16, 1998) (Coast
Guard held not liable for takings of whales by non-Coast Guard vessels that the Coast Guard
permits to operate in navigable waters by issuance of Certificates of Documentation and
Inspection). See also Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163-64 (1stCir. 1997), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 978 (1998), stating in dictum that a state is not liable for takings committed by
automobiles and their drivers licensed by the state, since
it is possible for a person licensed by [the state] to use a car in a manner
that does not risk ... violations of federal law .... Where the state has
licensed an automobile driver to use that automobile and her license in a
manner consistent with both state and federal law, the violation of federal
law is caused only by the actor's conscious and independent decision to
disregard or go beyond the licensed purposes of her automobile use and
instead to violate federal ... law. (dicta)
243
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directly caused by the actions of a private person, when that person's actions
are the proximate result of the governmental body's '"harmfully' inadequate
regulation" of that person's conduct. 245 Although the Eleventh Circuit did not
define "harmfully inadequate regulation" in this case, the court suggested
that "harmfully inadequate regulation" would be established if a statute or
ordinance were "(insufficient on [its] face to prevent 'harm') to [the
protected animals] .... " 246 The Eleventh Circuit also referred to the issue of
whether a governmental body engaged in "full and complete enforcement"
of an ordinance that was sufficient on its face to prevent "harm" and takings
in violation of the ESA. 247
"Harmfully inadequate regulation" should be found to exist either
when a governmental body's statute, ordinance or regulation is insufficient
on its face to prevent "harm" and "takings" by regulated persons, or when a
facially sufficient statute, ordinance or regulation is not fully and completely
enforced by the governmental body (resulting in prohibited takings in
violation of the ESA by the persons regulated by the statute, ordinance, or
regulation).
A governmental regulatory program that explicitly prohibits regulated
individuals and corporations from engaging in acts that proximately cause
prohibited takings of protected animals in violation of the ESA, nevertheless
should be considered to be "harmfully inadequate" and the proximate cause
of any prohibited takings that are directly caused by a regulated individual
or corporation in one of two ways: first, if there is a finding that the
regulatory program on its face has substantive inadequacies (such as
exemptions or defenses that nullify substantive prohibitions) that are
proximate (foreseeable and "but for") causes of the prohibited takings;
second, if the governmental body's implementation and enforcement of the
program has inadequacies that are foreseeable and "but for" causes of the
prohibited takings. Governmental enforcement measures should not be found
to be inadequate if the governmental body is implementing reasonable
enforcement measures in view of the financial resources available to the
governmental body and other obligations and duties of the governmental
body, even if some takings are being caused by acts of regulated persons in
violation of the regulatory program.
24

~ Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1249 (11th Cir.
1998).
246
/d. at 1250.
247 Id.
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This theory does not seek to hold a governmental entity liable for a
taking in violation of the ESA on the basis of a failure by the governmental
entity to adequately regulate the actions of the private person that directly
caused the taking. Rather, under the theory, a governmental entity is liable
only for a prohibited taking directly caused by another person when the
taking is the proximate result of the governmental body's affirmative, but
"harmfully inadequate," regulation of those actions of the private person. In
order for a governmental body to avoid liability under this theory, the
governmental body must amend its existing "harmfully inadequate"
regulations that are permitting private persons to engage in actions that cause
prohibited takings of protected animals, so that the governmental body's
amended regulations, on their face and as enforced, prohibit the actions by
private persons that cause the takings of protected animals in violation of the
ESA. Of course, a governmental body can avoid such liability for "harmfully
inadequate regulation" in two ways. Liability may be avoided by not
affirmatively enacting that type of regulatory program or by abrogating an
existing regulatory program that has been found to be "harmfully
inadequate," unless the governmental body has an affirmative obligation
under federal, state, or local law to enact and enforce an adequate regulatory
program of the type, so that the governmental body might be liable under the
FWS regulation defining "harm" for its omission (its failure to enact and
enforce an adequate regulatory program that prevents the takings in violation
of the ESA). 248
After the remand of the artificial beachfront lighting and sea turtle
case from the Eleventh Circuit to the District Court, the District Court held
that the takings of protected sea turtles in violation of the ESA were being
caused by privately-owned artificial beachfront lighting sources and that the
county council was not liable for these takings under the theory of "harmfully
inadequate" regulation. 249 The basis for this holding was that the county's
affirmative acts of adopting and enforcing an ordinance to protect sea turtles
from privately owned artificial beachfront lighting sources did not
proximately cause the prohibited takings of sea turtles. The District Court
reasoned that although the county's ordinance banned on its beaches light
from artificial lighting sources, protected sea turtles were being harmed by
light on the county beaches from artificial lighting sources because the
248

A person's liability for an omission or failure to act under the FWS regulation defining
"harm" is discussed supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
249
Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla.
2000).

2003]

AFrERMATH OF SWEET HOME CHAPTER

589

county's "beach residents are not turning off their lights in compliance with
the ordinance." 250 The District Court did not consider whether "harmfully
inadequate" enforcement of this ordinance by the county council was the
proximate cause of private persons not turning off their artificial lighting
sources in compliance with the ordinance, because the Court held that
"Plaintiffs' case is not based upon the County's failure to enforce the sea
turtle protection ordinance, nor do Plaintiffs contend that an alleged failure
to enforce the ordinance would violate the ESA." 251
Professor J .B. Ruhl has argued that the principle that holds a
governmental body liable for a taking caused by another person acting with
governmental authorization or with inadequate governmental regulation
imposes vicarious liability without sound legal basis under the ESA. 252 This
kind of governmental liability, however, is not vicarious liability, but rather
liability based either upon a governmental body's affirmative act of
authorizing or permitting an action by another person that proximately takes
an animal protected by the ESA or upon a governmental body's affirmative
act of regulating the acts of other persons in a harmfully inadequate manner
that causes prohibited takings in violation of the ESA. Furthermore,
imposition of liability upon a governmental body in such situations is a
reasonable interpretation and application of the FWS regulation defining
"harm," because such governmental liability is based upon traditional and .
ordinary common law tort principles of foreseeability, proximate causation,
and "but for" causation.
Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution,253
a private person cannot bring a suit in federal district court, under the ESA's
citizen suit provision254 or otherwise, against a state or an "arm" of a state,
seeking an injunction to enforce the ESA's takings prohibitions. The
Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits a private person from bringing a
suit in federal court against a nonconsenting state255 or "arm" of a state. 256
250

/d. at 1307.
/d.
m J.B. Ruhl, State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, 16 NAT.
REsOURCES & ENV'T., Fall 2001, at 70.
253
U.S. CONST. amend. XI, (''The Judicial power of the United states shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.").
254
16 u.s.c. § 1540(g) (2000).
255
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 72 (1996).
256
Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 1996). This case names
a number of factors to be considered by a court in determining whether a suit by a private
251
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The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not bar a private person's suit in
federal court against a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of
a state. 257 It also does not immunize a state or an "arm" of a state from being
sued in federal court by either the United States258 or by another state. 259
Either the federal government (in a suit under section ll(e)(6)260 of the ESA)
or another state (in a suit under the ESA's citizen suit provision) could
enforce the ESA's takings prohibitions against a state or an "arm" of a state
in a suit filed in federal district court. 261
A state or local governmental body's liability in a federal court for
violation of the ESA' s takings prohibitions also may be limited by the Tenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution or by separation of powers
rules. 262 A federal court may exceed its powers if it issues an injunction
requiring a state or local governmental body to enact and enforce "a
particular regulatory regime that enforces and furthers a federal policy,"263
party against a governmental entity is a prohibited suit against an "ann" of a state, including:
( 1) how the entity is referred to in the documents that created it; (2) how
the governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is
funded; (4) whether the entity's function is traditionally one of local or
state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the entity's
actions; and (6) whether the entity's obligations are binding upon the state.
/d. at 293.
251
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
258
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892).
259
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 n.12 (1972). The Eleventh Amendment,
however, does bar a suit by a plaintiff state against another state when the plaintiff state
actually is suing as a trustee on behalf of its individual citizens to obtain damages for them
for their individual claims. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365,375-76 (1923); New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90-91 (1883).
260
16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6).
261
Pursuant to section 6(t), 16 U.S.C. § 1535(t), of the ESA (providing that the ESA shall
not be construed to void state laws or regulations intended to conserve fish or wildlife and
permits state laws or regulations respecting the taking of a protected species to be more
restrictive than the ESA or regulations under the ESA), a state has the authority to enact
legislation authorizing its state courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits against the state or
an "ann" of the state to enforce the ESA's takings prohibitions.
262
See generally Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council ofVolusia County, 148 F.3d 1231,
1253-55 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1081(1999); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155,
169 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 978(1998); Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882
F.2d 1294, 1298 (8th Cir. 1989).
263
Strahan, 127 F.3d at 169.
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although a ·federal court in an appropriate case can issue an injunction
prohibiting a state or local governmental body from continuing to enforce a
particular existing regulatory program until it can do so without violating the
ESA's takings prohibitions 264 or an injunction requiring state or local
governmental officials to find a means of bringing a governmental body's
regulatory program into compliance with federallaw. 265
VII.

CONCLUSION

The word "injures" in the FWS regulation defining "harm" should be
interpreted to include significant adverse impacts upon a protected animal's
breeding, feeding, or sheltering, as well as a physical injury, wound or
disease. However, in order for habitat modification to constitute "harm"
under the FWS regulation, the habitat modification must not only
significantly impair an animal's breeding, feeding or sheltering but also must
otherwise kill or injure the animal. Significant impairment of an animal's
breeding, feeding, or sheltering by habitat modification by itself should not
be sufficient to constitute an injury under the FWS regulation defining
"harm." Courts should, permit, however, an animal's habitat and injury to an
animal from habitat modification or degradation to be established either by
the opinions of expert scientific witnesses or by circumstantial evidence.

264
265

Defenders of Wildlife, 882 F.2d at 1298.
Strahan, 127 F.3d at 170.

